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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor, was renowned for his genius. His masterful 
exposition of Christian theology, drawing upon Aristotle’s philosophy to form a solid 
intellectual foundation for Christian ideas, has formed the core of the Catholic Church’s 
teaching for almost a thousand years. Beyond Christianity, Aquinas has also exerted a 
major influence on legal philosophy. As the foremost expositor of natural law theory, 
natural law theorists to the present age owe a great debt to Aquinas’s discussion of law in 
his Treatise On Law. However, one aspect of Aquinas’s legacy has generated an inordinate 
amount of contention – his view of the relationship between justice and legality. Is an 
unjust law a law at all? Modern natural law theorists taking contradictory positions all claim 
to be faithful to Aquinas’s ideas on the matter. Some, taking a view that has been described 
as “strong natural law theory”, argue that Aquinas believed that the injustice of a law 
renders it legally invalid. Others, taking the position of “weak natural law theory”, argue 
that Aquinas perceived an unjust law as legally defective but still a law in a secondary sense. 
Even legal positivists, the traditional opponents of natural law theory, have proposed 
interpretations of Aquinas’s thoughts on the matter. They cannot all be correct.  
                                                 
 The author is grateful to Professor Eric Claeys, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University for 
his comments and advice. Any mistakes or omissions remain the author’s own. 
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This paper is directed at investigating what really Aquinas’s position was on the relationship 
between justice and legality. It will do so by taking a detailed look at Aquinas’s Treatise 
On Law, the broader context of the Summa Theologiae (“the Summa”) within which the 
Treatise is situated, and Aquinas’s methodological and definitional approaches. The 
outline of the paper is as follows. First, it will describe the different positions that modern 
natural law theorists have taken on the relationship between justice and legality, with a 
view to identifying the key conceptual differences between strong and weak natural law 
theory. Second, it will briefly describe how Aquinas’s thought on this issue has been 
interpreted by modern legal theorists, to illustrate the extent of disagreement between 
interpreters of Aquinas. Third, it will provide an overview of Aquinas’s arc of argument in 
his Treatise On Law, to provide context for the subsequent deep-dive into Aquinas’s 
thought. Fourth, the paper will formulate a set of questions to be resolved, corresponding 
to the key conceptual differences between strong and weak natural law theory, and will 
then evaluate Aquinas’s text, context, and methodology to determine how Aquinas’s 
thought bears on these questions.  
 
II  NATURAL LAW POSITIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSTICE AND 
LEGALITY 
 
While natural law theorists have offered a variety of interpretations of the relationship 
between justice and legality over the ages, two main schools of thought have crystallized 
– theorists have termed these schools “strong natural law theory” and “weak natural law 
theory”.1 The focus of this section will be to identify the key differences between these 
two schools of thought as a foundation for the subsequent analysis of Aquinas’s thought.  
                                                 
1 Mark C. Murphy, ‘Two Unhappy Dilemmas for Natural Law Jurisprudence’ (2015) 60(2) American Journal 
of Jurisprudence 121. 
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It will be useful to first set out the common ground between both schools of thought, 
before articulating their differences. All natural law theorists affirm that law’s legality 
depends in some way on its moral content.2 Put another way, in the natural law view, the 
substantive justice of a law has an impact on its legality.3 Different natural law theorists 
have different views on the degree of this impact, but all natural law theorists unanimously 
affirm the existence of such an impact. This affirmation sets natural law theory apart from 
legal positivism. Legal positivists, in contrast, affirm that the legality of law is independent 
of its moral content – the issues of law’s morality and its legality are distinct analytical 
inquiries, and one can achieve a comprehensive and accurate account of law without 
reference to its moral content.4 
 
The key difference between strong and weak natural law theory lies in their conception of 
the precise impact of morality on legality. The strong natural law view interprets the 
morality of law as an “existence condition” for law, akin to how having three sides is a 
necessary requirement for a triangle.5 Just as a shape comprising more than three sides 
cannot be a triangle, the character of legality cannot be possessed by a manifestly unjust 
norm.6 As argued by Gustav Radbruch, a manifestly unjust law is not a law at all.7 A law, 
despite being validly passed by a legitimate law-making authority, is not a law at all if it 
                                                 
2 Joseph Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’ in George Pavlakos 
(ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing, 2007) 17, 17-22. 
3 Robert Alexy, ‘The Ideal Dimension of Law’ in George Duke and Robert P. George (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 314, 314-315. 
4 Raz, above n 2, 17-22. 
5 Jonathan Crowe, ‘Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Law Theories’, in George Duke and Robert P. 
George (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 103, 
114; Murphy, above n 1. 
6 Dan Priel, ‘That Can’t Be Rights’ (2011) 2(1) Jurisprudence 227, 228.  
7 Alexy, above n 3, 321, 330; Gustav Radbruch, ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law’ (2006) 26 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 (B. Litschewski Paulson and S. Paulson trans, first published 1946). 
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surpasses an extreme level of injustice.8 Thus, a law that is substantively unjust is not just 
morally or legally defective – it cannot properly be called a law at all. Since unjust laws are 
not laws at all, on this view, they cannot possess any obligatory force. 
 
It should be noted at this juncture that some influential legal positivists, such as John 
Austin, have cast the position of natural law theory on the relationship between morality 
and legality as an extreme version of strong natural law theory – that all promulgated laws 
are necessarily moral.9 This conception of strong natural law theory is certainly not one 
that strong natural law theorists hold themselves, for good reason – such a proposition is 
easily disproven as an empirical matter. Strong natural law theorists do accept that 
legitimate law-making authorities can promulgate rules which are unjust, as an empirical 
fact about their law-making power.10 However, strong natural law theorists would hold 
that even if validly promulgated, these unjust rules are not laws.11  
 
Weak natural law theorists, on the other hand, interpret the morality of law as a 
“defectiveness condition” of law.12 In other words, the injustice of a law makes the law 
defective as a law.13 This should be carefully distinguished from the view that the injustice 
of a law makes a law morally defective – this would be a decidedly uninteresting proposition 
which cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the legal positivist position.14 Rather, 
the weak natural law position is that the injustice of a law makes a law legally defective. 
Thus, in contrast with the strong natural law position, morality does not spell a necessary 
                                                 
8 David A. J. Richards, ‘Taking Taking Rights Seriously Seriously: Reflections on Dworkin and the American 
Revival of Natural Law’ (1977) 52 NYU Law Review 1265, 1275.    
9 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London, 1832) at 185; Robin West, ‘Natural Law 
Ambiguities’ (1993) 25 Connecticut Law Review 829, 834. 
10 West, above n 9, 834; Alexy, above n 3, 327.  
11 Alexy, above n 3, 328. 
12 Crowe, above n 5, 114-115.  
13 Murphy, above n 1, 136. 
14 Priel, above n 6; Murphy, above n 1, 131. 
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existence condition for a law, but goes toward whether a law is one in the fullest sense, or 
is merely a law in a secondary sense of the term. On this view, it is possible to identify true 
legal propositions in a legal system without regard to morality, by considering whether they 
have been “authoritatively issued” and whether they are “socially efficacious”.15 But if one 
seeks to evaluate whether these propositions are indeed laws in the full sense, the justice 
of these laws must be taken into account.16 As a matter of law’s obligatory power, the weak 
natural law view holds that unjust laws do lose obligatory force – they do not “bind in 
conscience”.17 However, in contrast to the strong natural law view, since these laws remain 
laws in a secondary sense, they are still capable of engendering obligatory force, albeit in a 
weaker sense. They can engender what John Finnis describes as legal-moral obligations, 
which are based on a recognition that an overall system of social ordering through law 
promotes security and stability, and thus can be a basis for a collateral moral obligation to 
obey an unjust law.18 
 
With the positions thus laid out, four key differences between the strong and weak natural 
law positions can be identified.  
 
First, the two positions take a different definitional approach to law. The strong natural 
law position sees a definition of law as the specification of a set of conditions that must 
be fulfilled – failing any of which, the precept in question is not a law at all. The weak 
                                                 
15 Alexy, above n 3, 328. 
16 Richards, above n 8, 1275. 
17 St. Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise On Law (R. J. Henle, S.J. trans, University of Notre Dame Press, 2012) 
Q. 96 a. 4; Robert P. George, ‘Kelsen and Aquinas on the Natural Law Doctrine’ in John Goyette, Mark S. 
Latkovic, Richard S. Myers (eds), St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition (The Catholic University 
of America Press, 2012) 237, 255. 
18 John Finnis, ‘Law as Fact and as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy on Law's Ideal 
Dimension’ (2014) 59 American Journal of Jurisprudence 85, 87. 
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natural law position applies the central case method in its definition of law.19 It sees the 
criteria for a definition of law as a set of conditions which specify what law is in the fullest 
sense – and if certain conditions are not met, the precept in question can still be validly 
described as a law, but in a less central sense.  
 
Second, as a consequence of their different definitional approaches to law, the two 
positions take a different view of the relationship between justice and legality. The strong 
natural law position views justice as a necessary condition for a norm to be a law, the 
absence of which means that a norm is not a law at all. In contrast, the weak natural law 
position views the justice of a law as a benchmark for determining whether it is a law in 
the focal sense. An unjust law remains a law, but is one in a less central sense.  
 
Third, the two positions take different views on the effect of injustice on a law’s obligatory 
force. The strong natural law position views injustice as removing all obligatory power 
from a putative law – if an unjust law loses legal character altogether, it cannot possess any 
obligatory power as a law. The weak natural law position, in contrast, accepts that an unjust 
law can nevertheless still engender collateral moral obligations as a valid law in a legal 
system providing a means of social ordering.  
 
Fourth, the strong natural law position views the positing of a law – i.e. the promulgation 
of a law by legitimate law-making authority – as a necessary but insufficient condition for 
a precept to be identified as a law. In contrast, the weak natural law position views positing 
as a necessary and sufficient condition for a precept to be identified as a law, such that 
there can be true legal propositions which are immoral.20   
                                                 
19 Note that the application of the central case method is not unique to natural law theorists. H. L. A. Hart 
applied it to great effect as well – see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 
1-17.  
20 John Finnis, ‘Natural Law and Legal Reasoning’ (1990) 38 Cleveland State Law Review 1, 6-7. 
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III  COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF AQUINAS 
 
Was Aquinas a strong or weak natural law theorist? There is no express answer to this 
question that can be found in his writings, for the simple fact that these theoretical 
categories did not exist in his time. As such, theorists since Aquinas have offered 
competing interpretations of Aquinas on the relationship between legality and justice.  
 
In modern legal philosophy, one of the most notable legal theorists to propose a position 
on the relationship between justice and legality was Sir William Blackstone. Although he 
did not explicitly claim to develop Aquinas’s ideas, he drew heavily upon Grotius’s 
thinking on natural law, who was in turn inspired by Aquinas. Blackstone is particularly 
worthy of mention here, since Blackstone’s formulation on the question of the legality of 
unjust laws has been the subject of much attention by subsequent thinkers. Indeed, 
Blackstone is commonly perceived as the first modern proponent of the strong natural 
law position, because of his well-known argument that “no human laws are of any validity” 
if contrary to the natural law.21 It is this statement that has attracted much ridicule and 
criticism from legal philosophers after Blackstone, primarily for the accusation that he 
elided descriptive and normative aspects in his account of law.22  
 
It is worth noting, however, that although Blackstone was heavily criticized for affirming 
a strong natural law position, it is by no means so unequivocal that he did indeed take the 
position that his critics charged him to have taken. Just a couple of pages from Blackstone’s 
infamous assertion that human laws contrary to the natural law are of no validity, 
Blackstone argued that human laws which transgress natural law and divine law ought not 
                                                 
21 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765) 41. 
22 For example, see Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (London, 1776) ix-xxv. 
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to be obeyed – in his words, we are “bound to transgress” them.23 This argument suggests 
that Blackstone himself, so sharply criticized for taking the view that unjust laws are no 
law at all, certainly comprehended that unjust laws remained laws in some sense and were 
thus laws which could be transgressed.  
 
Despite the fact that Blackstone’s view of the relationship between justice and legality was 
not unequivocally the strong natural law one, leading legal positivists such as Jeremy 
Bentham, Austin, and H. L. A. Hart all attributed the strong natural law position to 
Aquinas and Blackstone.24 They characterized the natural law position as the strong natural 
law one, and criticized natural law theory on that basis. Austin criticized Blackstone in 
famously strong language: “to say that human laws which conflict with the divine law are 
not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious laws, 
and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God, have been and are 
continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals.”25 It is worth noting that these legal 
positivists often go further to interpret the natural law position on justice and legality as 
the claim identified in the preceding section as an extreme version of strong natural law 
theory – the view that unjust laws are never promulgated and enforced.26  
 
Leading modern natural law theorists are unified in their efforts to correct the 
misperception that natural law theory is necessarily associated with this extreme version 
of strong natural law. However, modern natural law theorists remain divided on their 
interpretation of Aquinas’s precise position on the relationship between justice and 
                                                 
23 Blackstone, above n 21, 43. 
24 Matthew Schaeffer, ‘Aquinas and the Ontological Flexibility of Law’, (2011) 24 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 377, 377; Norman Kretzmann, ‘Lex Iniusta Non est Lex – Laws on Trial in Aquinas’ Court of 
Conscience’ (1988) 33 American Journal of Jurisprudence 99, 100-101; Edward J. Damich, ‘The Essence of Law 
According to Thomas Aquinas’ (1985) 30 American Journal of Jurisprudence 79, 79. 
25 Kretzmann, above n 24, 101; Damich, above n 24, 79. 
26 Kretzmann, above n 24, 101, 104.  
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legality. Robert Alexy and Radbruch view the strong natural law position as the one most 
faithful to Aquinas’s legacy.27 But Finnis and Robert George, proponents of the weak 
natural law position, disagree. As Finnis argues: “if we examine the writings of Thomas 
Aquinas – perhaps the greatest of natural law seminal thinkers – we cannot find a single 
passage in which he declares without qualification that unjust law is not a law at all.”28 
Finnis takes the position that the “unjust law is not a law” maxim is either “flatly self-
contradictory” or is a “dramatization” of Aquinas’s real point – which Finnis took to be 
that an unjust law is not law in the focal sense, and is merely a law in a secondary sense.29 
In a similar vein, George argues that legal positivists have misunderstood Aquinas, and 
suggests that Aquinas, as a weak natural law theorist, would in fact have affirmed Hart’s 
descriptive methodology and fleshed it out further by substantiating the specific inquiry 
within the internal point of view that Hart proposed.30 Natural law theorists such as Finnis 
and George seek to shift the focus of natural law theory away from the question of the 
effect of injustice on laws towards articulating a full justificatory account of law – an 
enterprise which they argue is more faithful to Aquinas’s intent than a narrow focus on 
the relationship between justice and legality.31  
 
This survey of competing interpretations illustrates that there have been significant 
variations in interpretations of Aquinas by modern legal theorists on the relationship 
between justice and legality. Beyond illustrating this point, however, this survey reveals an 
interesting picture about interpretations of Aquinas. The theorist to whom the strong 
natural law position has been most commonly attributed arguably did not take such a 
position at all – Blackstone. The theorists who are the most adamant in their 
                                                 
27 Alexy, above n 3, 327; Radbruch, above n 7. 
28 Damich, above n 24. 
29 David Langwallner, ‘Western Jurisprudence’ (2005) 27 Dublin University Law Journal 401, 405. 
30 George, above n 17, 241. 
31  Brian Bix, ‘On the Dividing Line between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism’ (2000) 75 Notre 
Dame Law Review 1613, 1622-1623. 
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characterizations of natural law theory as necessitating the strong natural law position are 
the legal positivists – no friends of Aquinas by any measure. These theorists, in their zeal 
to attack natural law theory, have even linked natural law theory to an extreme version of 
strong natural law theory – in other words, the least defensible and easily-attacked 
formulation.32 This, of course, does not settle the issue, since some modern natural law 
theorists have mounted a serious defense of the strong natural law position.33 However, 
one might be justifiably cautious of an interpretation of Aquinas’s position most 
commonly advocated by his opponents. 
 
IV  OVERVIEW OF AQUINAS’S TREATISE ON LAW 
 
With the context thus set, it is time to turn to Aquinas’s own words on the matter.  
 
In order to obtain a clearer understanding of Aquinas’s intentions, it is useful to first 
understand the context of Aquinas’s arguments in his Treatise On Law. The Treatise was 
not intended to be a standalone work on legal philosophy. Rather, it was situated within a 
broader magisterial work focused on theology – the Summa. Specifically, the Treatise was 
situated within the section of the Summa on moral theology, as part of an exposition of the 
external influences on human acts or decision-making.34 Thus, his Treatise was not limited 
to human law, and covers a variety of different laws that bear on human action.35  
 
The outline of his arguments in the Treatise is as follows. Aquinas made his arguments 
about law over a span of eight questions in the Summa, running from QQ. 90-97. He began 
the Treatise by proposing a four-part definition of law in Q. 90 – a law is (1) a certain 
                                                 
32 Kretzmann, above n 24. 
33 For example, Alexy, above n 3. 
34 Aquinas, above n 17, [067]-[068].  
35 William S. III Brewbaker, ‘Thomas Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Law’ (2007) 58 Alabama Law Review 
575, 601. 
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dictate of reason (2) for the common good, (3) made by him who has the care of the 
community, and (4) promulgated.36 He moved on in Q. 91 to apply this definition to four 
different types of law that have a bearing on human action and decision-making – eternal 
law, natural law, divine law, and human law.37 In Q. 92, he focused on the effect of law 
generally on human acts – one of his key areas of concern, given the situation of the 
Treatise in the moral theology section of the Summa. In QQ. 93-94, he sought to elucidate 
the features of the eternal law and natural law respectively. He dedicated QQ. 95-97 to a 
discussion of human law. In Q. 95, he examined human law as a concept in relation to the 
other types of law he had proposed – is human law useful, in view of the existence of the 
other types of law? And how does one derive human law from the natural law? In Q. 96, 
he considered the power of human law – what should human law look like? What is the 
nature of its obligatory power? Finally, in Q. 97, he discussed the principles that govern 
change in human law.   
 
V  AQUINAS’S POSITION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSTICE AND 
LEGALITY 
 
A  Methodology 
 
To determine Aquinas’s position on the relationship between justice and legality, I 
formulated four questions, corresponding to the key differences between the strong and 
weak natural law positions that I highlighted in Section II. Determining how Aquinas’s 
thought resolves these questions can help one to determine whether Aquinas was a strong 
or weak natural law theorist. 
 
                                                 
36 Aquinas, above n 17, Q. 90 a. 4 corpus. 
37 Aquinas, above n 17, Q. 91. 
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The questions I sought to answer as I studied Aquinas’s thought are as follows. First, was 
Aquinas’s definitional approach to law characterized by the provision of necessary 
conditions that must all be fulfilled, or by the use of a central case method? Second, did 
Aquinas view injustice as rendering a law legally invalid, or merely legally defective? Third, 
did Aquinas view the effect of injustice on law as rendering it entirely non-obligatory, or 
as still capable of engendering obligations in a limited sense? Fourth, did Aquinas view the 
valid positing of a law as a necessary and sufficient condition for the identification of true 
legal propositions, or as a necessary but insufficient condition? To resolve these questions, 
the main focus of my inquiry was the text of Aquinas’s Treatise On Law. My study was 
not limited to the Treatise, however – in order to obtain a better understanding of 
Aquinas’s intentions and arguments in the Treatise, I also considered the broader context 
of the Summa within which the Treatise is situated, as well as Aquinas’s methodological 
and definitional approaches. 
 
B  Whether Aquinas Defined Law Via Necessary Conditions Method Or Central 
Case Method 
 
First, we will explore Aquinas’s methodological approaches to determine if they shed light 
on his definitional approach to law.  
 
To discern Aquinas’s definitional approach to law, it is instructive to consider the 
methodological approaches that Aquinas would have taken to the enterprise of definition as 
a general matter. As a thinker heavily influenced by Aristotle’s philosophy, Aquinas’s 
approach to definition was shaped by Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Four Causes.38 In brief, 
the objective of this approach was to explain a concept, not to provide an analytical tool to 
                                                 
38 R. J. Henle, ‘A Comment on Edward J. Damich’s The Essence of Law According to Thomas Aquinas’ 
(1988) 33 American Journal of Jurisprudence 161; Aquinas, above n 17, [178]-[179]. 
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demarcate its boundaries and determine what lies within and without.39 Applied to a 
concept such as law, the Doctrine would be primarily directed at explaining what law is, 
rather than determining how one can identify laws.40 The Doctrine of the Four Causes seeks 
to explain a concept by elucidating its various causes: its Formal Cause, Final Cause, 
Material Cause, and Efficient Cause. The word “cause” in the Doctrine is used in a broader 
sense than in contemporary usage – here, it refers to “any factor that is necessary to bring 
about an effect through an intrinsic relationship to that effect”.41 The Material Cause is 
“that out of which or in which the effect is produced”.42 The Efficient Cause is “the cause 
that contributes to the effect by activity.”43 The Final Cause is “the cause that contributes 
to the effect by being desired”44 – in modern parlance, this may be described as the purpose 
of the effect. The Formal Cause “contributes to the effect by being in it and making it to 
be the kind of thing it is.”45 One will observe that Aquinas’s four-part definition of law 
corresponds to the Four Causes.46 Law’s Formal Cause is reason. Its Final Cause is the 
common good. Its Efficient Cause is promulgation by the one who has the care of the 
community. Its Material Cause is the “community or human acts within society”.47  
 
For present purposes, the key point to note from this discussion of Aquinas’s definitional 
method is that in the explanation of law through the Doctrine of the Four Causes, morality 
relates to law’s Final Cause. And in Aquinas’s account, a defective expression of the Final 
                                                 
39 Henle, above n 38, 161-162. 
40 This is not to say that Aquinas’s approach had nothing to say to the question of the identification of law. 
Rather, knowledge of Aquinas’s definitional approach merely illustrates that Aquinas’s first objective was 
explanatory – but this approach did supply Aquinas with the contours of the central case of law, which is 
relevant to the question of identification. See Henle, above n 38, 161.  
41 Aquinas, above n 17, [182]. 
42 Ibid [189]. 
43 Ibid [193]. 
44 Ibid [196]. 
45 Ibid [200]. 
46 Ibid [210]. 
47 Ibid [210]. 
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Cause does not mean that the entire effect in question ceases to exist – the effect’s existence 
is a separate inquiry from the effect’s Final Cause. The effect’s existence is defined by its 
Efficient Cause. An understanding of an effect’s Final Cause, in contrast, goes towards a 
fuller explanation of the nature of law – its central case. Aquinas’s definition of law is thus 
shaped by his metaphysics – that one cannot understanding something fully without also 
knowing its end.48 This lends weight to the proposition that Aquinas’s definitional 
approach was not the necessary conditions method, but was instead directed at achieving 
full understanding of a concept – a method closely aligned with the central case method.  
 
As an additional point on Aquinas’s methodological inclinations, one might add that a 
distinctive mark of Scholastic philosophy was the art of distinguishing, and that Aquinas 
was the Scholastic philosopher par excellence.49 The methodological technique of drawing 
careful distinctions between concepts has been described as “a standard part of Scholastic 
method.”50 Indeed, Aquinas himself frequently began his discussion of concepts by stating 
that a particular concept can have the same property in two ways, and then carefully 
distinguishing both ways to erase contradictions and clarify that both ways can be equally 
true.51 For example, in the context of law, Aquinas used this method to explain that human 
laws can be derived from the natural law in two ways – direct deduction and determinatio – 
in order to avoid the troublesome proposition that all human laws are the same 
everywhere, a proposition that would otherwise have seemed to follow from his earlier 
propositions that all human laws are derived from natural law, and that the natural law is 
the same for everyone.52 Aquinas also specifically applied this technique to the question of 
unjust laws, which we will discuss in more detail in the subsequent sections. At this point, 
                                                 
48 Brewbaker, above n 35, 588.  
49 Damich, above n 24, 93. 
50 Aquinas, above n 17, [059]. 
51 Aquinas, above n 17, [059]. 
52 Aquinas, above n 17, [063], Q. 95 a. 2. 
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it is sufficient to note that in view of Aquinas’s skill at Scholastic methodology, it would 
have been most unlikely for him to have perceived injustice as taking a norm out of the 
category of law entirely – it would have been much more in character with his Scholastic 
mind to characterize unjust laws as remaining a species of law but in a distinct sense from 
the central case.  
 
As a final point on Aquinas’s methodological inclinations, it is significant to note that he 
was well-acquainted with Aristotle’s concepts of univocity and equivocity.53 Univocity 
describes concepts which have both the same name and meaning. Equivocity describes 
concepts which have the same name but which may have different meanings, depending 
on the context in which the concept is used.54 In this framework, a concept described by 
the same word has a central or focal meaning, yet the same word can be used to describe 
concepts which are related to that central meaning but in a less central way.55 Aquinas’s 
familiarity with these analytical devices suggests that his definitional approach would be 
shaped by these concepts – and a central case definitional approach matches the use of 
these devices much more closely than would a necessary conditions approach. 
 
Second, observing Aquinas’s approach to ethics can shed light on how his definitional 
approach to law should be interpreted. In Aquinas’s definition of virtue, he was careful to 
distinguish between perfect virtue and virtues in the restricted sense. In brief, Aquinas held 
that people acquired perfect virtue only if they performed good acts imbued with the 
divine gift of charity – it is only such acts which are properly directed to “the ultimate end” 
of mankind.56 Good acts which are directed only at natural ends lead men to acquire virtues 
                                                 
53 Damich, above n 24, 85. 
54 Damich, above n 24, 85-86; John Finnis, ‘Natural Law Theory: Its Past and Its Present’ (2012) 57 American 
Journal of Jurisprudence 81, 96. 
55 Finnis, above n 54, 96. 
56 Fergus Kerr, Thomas Aquinas: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2009) 72-74. 
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as well, but only in a restricted sense.57 In a similar vein, Aquinas argued that human acts 
are good insofar as they possess moral perfection in being, and are morally bad to the 
extent that they are deficient in their being, falling short of the perfection they ought to 
have.58 Indeed, Aquinas’s discussion of ethics is replete with uses of the central case 
definitional approach, and it stands to reason that he would apply a similar definitional 
approach to law, which he saw as a field situated within the domain of ethics.59 
 
Third, Aquinas’s discussion of law in the Treatise itself clearly evinces an application of 
the central case method. In Q. 90 a. 2, where he discussed, as part of his definition of law, 
whether law is necessarily ordered to the common good, he analogized the relationship 
between the common good and law to the relationship between heat and fire. Fire, 
described as the “hottest of all things”, is the central cause of heat – and other bodies are 
hot only “insofar as they have a share of fire”.60 In an analogous fashion, any precept “lacks 
the nature of law except insofar as it is ordered to the Common Good.”61 Aquinas 
elaborated upon this point in Q. 92 a. 1 – laws not perfectly ordered toward the common 
good are laws secundum quid, i.e. laws in a certain respect, while laws properly ordered to 
the common good are laws simpliciter, i.e. laws in the central sense.62 
 
Given that Aquinas incorporated the common good as part of his definition of law, these 
passages should shape our interpretation of the definition of law he offered in Q. 90 a. 4. 
Since Aquinas expressly conceived the relationship between the common good and law as 
governed by the central case method, this lends weight to Kretzmann’s argument that 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Martin Grabmann, Thomas Aquinas: His Personality and Thought (Longmans, Green and Co., 1928) 153-154. 
59 Vincent McNabb, O.P., St. Thomas Aquinas and Law (Blackfriars, 1955) 5-6. 
60 Aquinas, above n 17, Q. 90 a. 2. corpus. 
61 Ibid Q. 90 a. 2. corpus. 
62 Ibid Q. 91 a. 1. corpus.  
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Aquinas’s definition of law has both evaluative and non-evaluative components.63 In 
Kretzmann’s view, the non-evaluative components of Aquinas’s definition, e.g. the 
requirement of promulgation by one who has care of the community, are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something to be identified as a law in a technical sense64 – they 
form the Efficient Cause of law, in Aquinas’s terminology. However, the evaluative 
components of Aquinas’s definition of law – for example, the requirement of being 
ordered to the common good – do not perform the same function, and are intended to 
explain the central case of law.65  
 
In sum, there is a strong argument to be made for the proposition that Aquinas’s 
definitional approach, insofar as the justice of laws is concerned, was characterized by the 
central case method. As an aside, it is a touch ironic to note that despite the attacks of 
modern legal positivists on natural law theory, Aquinas, the father of natural law theory, 
adopted a definitional approach to law that was actually rather akin to Hart’s own approach 
to defining the concept of law.66 For present purposes, the key point is that Aquinas’s use 
of the central case method suggests that Aquinas was more aligned with the weak natural 
law position than the strong natural law position. Aquinas did not view his definition of 
law as setting out a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that must all be met for a 
certain precept to be a law – rather, it was intended to be a full explanatory account of the 
central case of law. 
 
C  Whether Aquinas Viewed Injustice As Rendering A Law Legally Invalid Or 
Legally Defective 
 
                                                 
63 Kretzmann, above n 24, 112. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Hart, above n 19, 1-17. 
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Moving from Aquinas’s definition of law to Aquinas’s discussion of unjust and tyrannical 
laws, we see Aquinas applying the central case method consistently. Even when Aquinas 
seemed the most vehement in declaring that unjust laws were not laws, he was generally 
careful to acknowledge that such laws were still laws in a limited sense.67  
 
For example, in Q. 92 a. 1, Aquinas took on the subject of tyrannical laws. He affirmed 
that “a tyrannical law, since it is not in accord with reason, is not a law in the full sense; 
rather, it is a perversion of law”.68 Taken in isolation, this statement may be taken to 
suggest that tyrannical laws are not laws – in support of the strong natural law position. 
But in the very next line, Aquinas was careful to note that such laws still have “something 
of the nature of law”.69 Similarly, in Q. 92 a. 3, Aquinas stated that since an unjust law 
deviates from reason, it “does not have the nature of law but rather of a sort of violence”.70 
Yet, once again, he carefully reiterated immediately that “even an unjust law retains some 
semblance of the nature of law, since it was made by one in power and in this respect it is 
derived from the Eternal Law”.71 
 
As Kretzmann argues, it is thus clear that Aquinas did not mean that laws which do not 
accord with right reason are not laws at all – rather, “an irrational law is not a law 
unconditionally because it falls short of at least one of the moral conditions essential to 
full-fledged law, but it is a law in a certain respect because it satisfies the formal conditions 
sufficient to establish it technically as a law.”72 As such, in Kretzmann’s view, legal 
                                                 
67 Schaeffer, above n 24, 378; Kretzmann, above n 24, 114. 
68 Aquinas, above n 17, Q. 92 a. 1 rep. 4. 
69 Aquinas, above n 17, Q. 92 a. 1 rep. 4. 
70 Ibid Q. 93 a. 3 rep. 2.     
71 Ibid Q. 93 a. 3 rep. 2.    
72 Kretzmann, above n 24, 115. 
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positivists accusing Aquinas of taking the strong natural law position, or even the extreme 
version of strong natural law, “are barking up trees Aquinas never considered climbing.”73 
 
However, these passages do not resolve the matter. There are other passages in the 
Treatise which can be taken to support the strong natural law position. Indeed, the 
strongest case for the strong natural law position can be found in Q. 95 a. 2 and a. 4. In 
these articles, Aquinas described unjust laws in terms that did not incorporate the “law 
simpliciter” language, and did not offer a subsequent affirmation of the legality of these laws. 
In Q. 95 a. 2, Aquinas quoted St. Augustine’s famous maxim, “That which is not just seems 
to be no law at all”, and went on to state that a law which “conflicts with the law of nature” 
is not a law, “but rather a perversion of law.”74 In a similar vein, in Q. 95 a. 4, Aquinas 
argued that a tyranny is “totally corrupt and therefore has no law.”75  
 
In view of Aquinas’s statements in these passages, how should one interpret Aquinas’s 
overall position on the relationship between justice and legality? It is suggested that there 
is no contradiction in Aquinas’s thought. His statements in Q. 95 a. 2 and a. 4, even when 
taken in isolation, are actually inconclusive on the matter of whether injustice removes 
legal validity entirely from a law. Indeed, these statements can be read consistently with 
the position that injustice renders a law legally defective, but does not strip it of legality. Thus, 
Aquinas’s statements in these passages may potentially be read to support the strong 
natural law thesis, but crucially, they do not necessitate it – and in view of his careful 
qualifications of the effect of irrationality on law in Q. 92, the more consistent 
interpretation of his statements in Q. 95 a. 2 and a. 4 is the weak natural law one. 
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74 Aquinas, above n 17, Q. 95 a. 2 corpus. 
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Another argument that may be raised to support the proposition that Aquinas thought 
that an unjust law would be invalid as law, rather than merely legally defective, rests on the 
fact that Aquinas’s quote of Augustine in Q. 95 a. 2 omitted the words “to me” that were 
in the original wording – Augustine’s original sentence was “that which is not just does 
not seem to me to be no law at all”.76 Taken in isolation, the omission of the words “to me” 
may be interpreted as suggesting that Aquinas intended to convey in stronger terms than 
Augustine that an unjust law was indeed not a law at all, as an expression of his confidence 
in the proposition.77 However, while the fact of omission may be conceded to be true, this 
suggestion rests on a rather weak inference of Aquinas’s intent, and is difficult to square 
with Aquinas’s express affirmations of the limited legality of unjust laws elsewhere in the 
Treatise.  
 
In sum, the better interpretation of Aquinas is that he viewed injustice as rendering a law 
legally defective, but not entirely legally invalid. 
 
D  Whether Aquinas Viewed Injustice As Rendering A Law Entirely Non-
Obligatory 
 
Turning our attention to Aquinas’s view on the effect of injustice on law’s obligatory force, 
it becomes quickly apparent that this was the real focus of Aquinas’s discussion of unjust 
laws. Aquinas was much more interested in the effect of injustice on law’s obligatory force, 
rather than its impact on legal validity. In Q. 96 a. 4, Aquinas described just laws as having 
“the power of binding in conscience”. On the other hand, unjust laws, reiterated again 
here to be “acts of violence rather than laws”, “do not bind in conscience”. The reiteration 
of Augustine’s maxim in this context suggests that Aquinas, in declaring that unjust laws 
are “acts of violence”, intended to convey the point that an unjust law loses obligatory force. 
                                                 
76 Kretzmann, above n 24, 100-101. 
77 Kretzmann, above n 24, 101. 
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This interpretation of Aquinas’s intent is in keeping with the situation of the Treatise 
within the moral theology section of the Summa – Aquinas’s arguments are better 
interpreted as directed first and foremost towards the effect of law on human actions and 
decision-making, rather than as analytical propositions about the concept of law.78 His 
account was not intended to be a jurisprudential account in the vein of modern legal 
philosophy, but an ethical-theological one.79 If Aquinas did not view injustice as primarily 
directed towards the issue of legal validity, this weighs heavily against the strong natural 
law view, which draws a robust connection between justice and legality. 
 
In further support of the weak natural law view, Aquinas did not perceive injustice as 
rendering a precept entirely devoid of obligatory force. Indeed, in Q. 96 a. 4 itself, Aquinas 
was careful to note that one might be obliged to obey an unjust law “in order to avoid 
scandal or disturbances”. This suggests a more nuanced conception of the effect of 
injustice on law than is admitted by the strong natural law position – instead of a precept’s 
injustice rendering it entirely void of legal character, such that it loses all obligatory power, 
Aquinas accepted that the injustice of a law does lead it to lose obligatory force in the central 
sense, but that the law can nevertheless oblige obedience in a secondary sense, to the extent 
that obedience to the law is required to prevent scandal and disorder in the legal system. 
Thus, Aquinas’s thought is closely related to Finnis’s concept of collateral moral 
obligations, and is better aligned with the weak natural law position.    
 
E  Whether Aquinas Viewed Valid Positing As A Necessary And Sufficient 
Condition To Identify True Legal Propositions 
 
                                                 
78 Damich, above n 24, 81-82; Russell Hittinger, ‘Thomas Aquinas and Natural Law on the Competence to 
Judge’ in John Goyette, Mark S. Latkovic, Richard S. Myers (eds), St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law 
Tradition (The Catholic University of America Press, 2012) 261, 283. 
79 Brewbaker, above n 35, 601. 
22 
 
The final object of our inquiry is to determine whether Aquinas viewed the valid positing 
of a law as a necessary and sufficient condition for a precept to be a true legal proposition, 
or as a necessary but insufficient condition. At first glance, this may seem a strange inquiry 
to undertake in this context – the answer to this question would seem more directly related 
to resolving whether Aquinas is a legal positivist or a natural law theorist. However, this 
inquiry is relevant here, since the weak natural law position is indeed in agreement with 
the legal positivist position that one can identify a true legal proposition solely as a matter 
of social fact and pedigree, and that true legal propositions can be manifestly unjust.80 The 
strong natural law position would disagree with these points – thus, this inquiry is one that 
can distinguish a weak natural law position from a strong natural law one. This is not to 
say, however, that the weak natural law position is identical to the legal positivist one. The 
preceding sections should have made sufficiently clear that weak natural law theory affirms 
that morality is necessary to give a full account of law in the focal sense, which is a claim 
that legal positivists would not accept.  
 
There are numerous indications in the Treatise On Law that Aquinas viewed the valid 
positing of a law as a necessary and sufficient condition for the identification of a true legal 
proposition. In Q. 91 a. 3, Aquinas accepted upfront that there are human laws which do 
not cohere perfectly with right reason – “human laws cannot have that infallibility that the 
demonstrated conclusions of the sciences have.”81 Recall that one of the elements of 
Aquinas’s definition of law is that laws are a “dictate of reason”. In view of this, Aquinas’s 
acceptance that there are human laws which do not cohere perfectly with right reason 
would make no sense if Aquinas thought that irrational laws were not laws at all – Aquinas 
clearly thought that laws can be validly identified independent of their coherence with right 
reason, thus allowing them to be characterized as irrational laws in the first place. 
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In addition, in a passage that has already been highlighted above, Aquinas in Q. 92 a. 1 
argued that laws not perfectly directed at the common good are laws secundum quid, while 
laws properly ordered to the common good are laws simpliciter.82 His recognition of the 
fact that laws falling short of perfect ordering towards the common good are nevertheless 
laws suggests that Aquinas believed that valid positing is indeed enough to make something 
a true legal proposition.  
 
Finally, Aquinas argued in Q. 97 a. 1 that human laws can and should change, as part of a 
natural progression of human reason to move from imperfection to perfection. 
Accordingly, human laws should change to adapt themselves better to the conditions of 
men as these conditions evolve.83 He cited Augustine’s example of laws concerning the 
appointment of government officials – if the electorate is sober-minded and right-thinking, 
a law allowing them to select government officials is a good one, but if the people 
degenerate into corruption and poor judgment, the law can justifiably be changed to 
reserve the right of selection to “a few good men”.84 Through his argument, Aquinas 
demonstrated a clear-eyed awareness that certain promulgated laws may not perfectly 
further the common good, and yet were still true legal propositions – indeed, if such 
precepts were not laws at all in Aquinas’s mind, it would have been nonsensical for 
Aquinas to discuss the question of whether laws can and should change. The idea that 
Aquinas clearly recognized that unjust laws nevertheless possess some sense of legality by 
virtue of being positive law is bolstered by his argument in Q. 97 a. 2. There, he argued 
that while the injustice of a law is a good reason to change a law, this law-changing 
prerogative should be exercised with prudence – changes in law diminish the binding 
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power of law, and laws should thus only change when “the damage done thereby to the 
common welfare is compensated by some other benefit”.85  
 
As such, the weight of evidence leans strongly in favor of the view that Aquinas thought, 
in alignment with the weak natural law position, that true legal propositions can be 
identified validly as a matter of social fact.  
 
VI  CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, Aquinas’s positions on the four questions I sought to answer by studying his work 
and his methodological techniques are as follows. Aquinas’s definitional approach to law 
was characterized by the central case method. He viewed injustice as rendering a law legally 
defective, rather than legally invalid. His discussion of the effect of injustice on law was 
focused on discerning its effect on law’s obligatory power, and he took the position that 
even an unjust law was capable of engendering legal obligations in a limited sense. Finally, 
Aquinas viewed the valid positing of a law as a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
identification of true legal propositions.  
 
The picture of Aquinas’s thought that emerges from this inquiry is clear. Although often 
cited in support of the strong natural law position, a careful reading of Aquinas reveals 
that his thinking was much more closely aligned with that of the weak natural law position. 
The text of the Treatise On Law, the broader context of the Summa, and Aquinas’s 
methodological approaches all point unanimously to this conclusion. While a strong 
natural law interpretation of some of Aquinas’s statements is certainly plausible, the key 
difficulty is that these interpretations are not necessitated by Aquinas’s text. To hold Aquinas 
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to the strong natural law position, one would have to blind oneself to all the other textual 
and contextual factors that point in the other direction.  
 
As such, it is suggested that the more justifiable interpretation of Aquinas is that he took 
the weak natural law position on the relationship between justice and legality, and that 
weak natural law theorists have a stronger claim to Aquinas’s legacy than strong natural 
law theorists. It should be noted that this conclusion does not bear on the question of 
which position is the better one as a matter of internal coherence and normative desirability. 
That question, however, is a topic for another occasion. 
 
 
 
 
